aws re: Invent

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AWS WAF: What a BOT it?

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What is a bot?

AWS WAF overview

Foundational rules

AWS WAF Bot Control and Fraud Control

Customer examples



What is a bot?

What is a bot?



l'm just a browser (hehehe)

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Bot use cases

Good bots

- Search engine
- Site monitoring

Authorized vulnerability scans

Bad bots

DDoS

- Account/credit card fraud
- Scraping/data theft
- SMS pumping
- "Click" bots

Grey area

- Social media
- Al bots
- Accidental bots

AWS WAF overview



Protect AWS and on-premises applications









AWS Verified Access AWS AppSync







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Visibility is power



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Foundational rules



Rate-based rules

Detect the HTTP flood attack and suppress the requests



Block L7 DDoS attacks once a rate threshold is reached

Layering rate-based rules



Catch-all rule Rule type: Rate-based Rule name: rbr_global Scope-down: None (matches all) Aggregation key: IP (default) Evaluation window: 300 (default) Limit: 500 Action: Block

<u>API rule</u>

Rule type: Rate-based Rule name: rbr_api Scope-down: If uri starts_with '/api/' Aggregation key: IP (default) Evaluation window: 300 Limit: 50 Action: Block

Layering rate-based rules – Anti-DDoS



Anti-DDoS rule Rule type: Rate-based Rule name: rbr_ddos Scope-down: None Aggregation key: Header (Host) + URI + IP Evaluation window: 60 Limit: 10 Action: Block

IP-based controls

Protection against attacks from known malicious IP addresses



Block or allow requests from specific IPs or IP sets

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IP repu	utatio	on lists

Amazon IP reputation list managed rule group

AWSManagedIPReputationList Rule action: **Block**

Choose rule action override

AWSManagedReconnaissanceList Rule action: **Block**

Choose rule action override

AWSManagedIPDDoSList Rule action: Count



"Challenge" rule action





JavaScript challenge

AWS WAF token



AWS WAF Bot Control and Fraud Control

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AWS WAF Bot and Fraud Control overview

Bot Control

- Identifies, labels, and manages both friendly and malicious bots
- 2 levels of protection
 - Common for self-identifying bots
 - Targeted for evasive bots

Fraud prevention

- Detects and prevents fraud attempts
- Account takeover prevention (ATP)
- Account creation fraud prevention (ACFP)



Detecting common bots

What are the common bots?

- Self-identifying
- Search engines/social media/HTTP library

GET /

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Host: www.example.com Accept: */* Accept-Encoding: deflate, gzip User-Agent: facebookexternalhit/1.1 (+http://www.facebook.com/externalhit_uatext.php) Range: bytes=0-524287 X-FB-CrawlerBot: AaknqfYqnBhDfF.....

What does common bot control do?

- Looks for request, IP, TLS fingerprint
- Verifies the bot
- Provides labels

aws:bot-control:bot:name:facebook

aws:bot-control:bot:category:social_media

aws:bot-control:bot:verified

Challenges of evasive bots

Challenges

- Use existing browser headers and values
- Not using well-known bot IP addresses
- Mimic the real browser activities such as JavaScript execution

Responses

- Client interrogation
- Uniquely identify the client session
- Monitor the client session behavior



A bit more on client interrogation

- JavaScript execution or CAPTCHA puzzle
- Collect client information
 - Canvas info/installed fonts/installed plugins/other
- Look for browser automation
 - Selenium/Puppeteer
- Collect client telemetries
 - Mouse movement/key press





Confirm

Silently challenging the browser



Challenging with the CAPTCHA



SDK integration



Without SDK integration





2. Challenge or CAPTCHA



- Client interrogation and token creation
- Can programmatically throw CAPTCHA

Mobile app

• Lower latency

Static frontend



With SDK integration

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1. API call such as fetch()



API endpoint

2. Detect and respond



Token for tracking

Detects	Details	Default action
Too many requests without token	More than 5 requests from 1 IP	Challenge
Too many requests from a session	Baseline determined with historic patterns Confidence level: Low/medium/high/maximum	Block for maximum CAPTCHA for high
Suspected automated browser	Indicators of browser automation found during the client challenge	САРТСНА
Browser inconsistency	Indicators of browser inconsistency found during the client challenge	САРТСНА
Single token among multiple IP, multiple ASN, multiple countries	Multiple level: Low/medium/high	Count for low CAPTCHA for medium Block for high



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Fraud prevention



Account takeover prevention (ATP)

Protects from credential stuffing and brute force

- Analyzes POST request to the login URL
- Detects compromised credentials
- Login and password traversal
- Tracks response too (when used with CloudFront)





Bad actor

Stolen credentials		
Login A	Password A	
Login B	Password B	
Login C	Password C	

Brute force		
Login X	password	
Login X	p@ssw0rd	
Login X	pa\$\$word	



Account creation fraud prevention (ACFP)

Prevents fraud account creation

- Analyzes human interaction in the registration page and POST request
 - SDK integration is mandatory for human interaction detection
- Detects phone number and address abuse





Bad actor

Detections include:

Compromised credentials

Human interactivity is absent

Same phone number or address is used multiple times

High volume of successful account creation



Customer examples



Bot Control building up example



Bot Control building up example



Continuously monitoring

ATP example – Collecting intelligence



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Don't let them know we know



Thank you!



Please complete the session survey in the mobile app

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